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UNCLASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Challenge and Response 
Uncertain future threats, operating environments, 
and fiscal constraints   
 
DoD could minimize impacts of consequences by 
preparing to be wrong 
 
T his  briefing focuses on defining, quantifying, 
analyzing, and embedding adaptability, flexibility, 
and responsiveness in weapon systems 
1 
Why Focus on Weapon Systems? 
Long- gestation, long- lived assets  whose design 
constraints  are enduring 
 
C an be rigorously analyzed and assessed, as  they 
are subject to physical laws 
 
C onsistent with DoD’s  approach to capability 
development and acquisition 
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Working Definitions 
Adaptability: a measure of the potential set of missions (or 
possible states within a mission space) that can be supported 
  
F lexibility: an inverse measure of the costs  of adapting (effort, 
capability tradeoffs , and dollar costs) -  the greater the costs  to 
adapt, the less  flexible the weapon system 
 
R esponsiveness: an inverse measure of the time required to 
adapt, i.e ., transition within a mission space or between missions 
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T hese definitions are rigorous and quantifiable 
 
Uncertainty and Requirements 
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Uncertainty regarding future adversaries, capabilities, 







How DoD tends to define requirements 
Low High 
Framework for Analysis and Design 
Identify a system’s: 
 Mission requirements 
 Design resources 
 Operational constraints  
 T echnical limitations 
 Fiscal constraints  
 C oupling of physical and 
  engineering relationships 
 
T hese factors comprehensively describe the system from user and technical 
perspectives 
S ystem capabilities  depend on how design resources are consumed and 
supplied by physical subsystems and operational constraints  (technical 
limitations) and are further bounded by fiscal constraints 
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T he framework is  used to identify existing and explore future embedded 














What About Standards? 
Standards are a claim on design resources 
 
S tandards can provide “business” performance 
across multiple platforms/ enterprise 
• C an be open or implic it 
 
S tandard has to be supported by suffic ient 
design resources to accommodate future 
requirements 
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Physics-based Cost-Capability Tradespace Analysis: 
Nominal IFV - Optimized vs. Adaptable Design (1 of 2) 
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Ballistic Trade space Weight Integral ballistic armor must be able to passively defeat ballistic threats.
Explosive Survive an X class of IED and a Y RPG Weight
Supports 45 pounds/square foot (psf) of integral underbody armor
and 95 psf of add-on EFP armor.
Passenger Capacity 9 pax Volume (length) Interior volume scales based on human factors and number of passengers (32 cubic ft/person and 450 lbs/person).
Full 
Spectrum
Weight Desire system to be reliable Weight
Structure, engine, transmission, etc. must be sized to support add-on 
EFP armor.
Power Increased exportable power
Power, Weight, 
Volume Has a 50-horsepower generator for electrical power.
Mobility Speed of X up a grade of Y Weight,Volume
Uses an Abrams-like track and has 15 horsepower/ton of engine 
power up-armored.
Uses currently producible armor materials, engines, etc.
Lethality Lethal to a similar class of vehicles Weight, Volume
Has a manned turret. Reserved 2.1 tons for non-armored turret 
weight and 120 cubic feet of volume. Also, 2.5 tons for ammunition 
and fuel.
Electronics and Sensors Similar to Abrams and Bradley
Power, Cooling, 
Volume (internal) Has sensors/electronics similar to Abrams and Bradley.
Transportability
(Operational constraint) Transportable by C-17 Weight restriction
Combat weight limited to 130,000 lbs and must fit inside 
compartment E of C-17.
 Specific adaptability objective 
 Enable the vehicle to remain operationally effective in increased-threat environments (STANAG 4 – 
STANAG 5) while continuing to satisfy the performance objectives in Table 1 
 Design approach 
 Vehicle structure/ suspension able to support growth up to 130K lbs. (C-17 op. constraint) 
 Why this margin? 
 The weight design resource dominates the force protection requirement 
Physics-based Cost-Capability Tradespace Analysis: 
Nominal IFV - Optimized vs. Adaptable Design (2 of 2) 
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 Adaptability: adaptable design (AD) superior to optimized design (OD) because it 
accommodates a larger range of threat environments without sacrific ing performance 
objectives 
 Flexibility: AD superior to OD at FP > S T AN AG 4 + 10% as nominal program costs  are less 
 R esponsiveness:  AD superior to OD as time required to upgrade is  far less 
Table 2: Performance and Relat ive 100th Unit  Procurement Costs ($K of  BY2012) 
Operating Environment 
Force Protection Level 
Requirement 





Cost, Δ Reference 
Adaptable Vehicle 
Cost, Δ Reference 
STANAG 4 Nominal Nominal Reference Cost $900 
STANAG 4 + 10% STANAG 5 Nominal Nominal $1,000 + RDT&E $1,000 
STANAG 4 + 20% STANAG 5 Nominal Nominal $1,800+RDT&E $1,200 
… 
STANAG 4 + 60% STANAG 5 Nominal Nominal $4,200+RDT&E $1,800 
STANAG 4 + 70% STANAG 5 System failure Nominal N/A $2,000 
… 
STANAG 5 System failure Nominal N/A $2,400 
Strategic Value vs. Tactical Cost 
 Strategic value of adaptable designs should not be calculated 
solely from “tactical” costs  (nominal program costs) 
 V alue (as  with insurance) should be calculated based on 
contributions of designs in all possible futures; adaptability 
(and insurance) are justified by the value they bring when 
relevant events occur, not by their continual use 
 R elevant events, i.e., responding to emergent threats  or 
opportunities , inevitably occur over a system’s service life 
 At the “right price,” we willingly buy insurance as a hedge 
against an uncertain future 
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How do decision makers decide what is  a reasonable price to pay 
for adaptability to provide a hedge against an uncertain future? 
Strategic Value Decision-Support Tool 
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S elect adaptable system 
S elect optimized system 
S elect adaptable system if confident in a 
<= X% likelihood this  protection level will 






S trategic  value is  quantifiable. It is  a function of a decis ion maker’s  confidence in potential 
events occurring and the Present V alues of competing systems at those events. 
Conclusion 
The planning challenges posed by uncertainties  – 
threats , operating & fiscal environments – are 
unlikely to wane 
 
U se trade space tools  to rigorously quantify and 
asses the value of adaptability and design margin 
 
S ignificant organizational challenges 
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